



## Looking Back, Looking Forward: Perspectives on Terrorism and Responses to It *Strategic Multi-layer Assessment<sup>1</sup> Occasional White Paper* September 2013

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## War on Terror or a Search for Meaning?

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The events of 9/11 necessitated a response. What shape that took was determined by the meaning attributed to those events, in its turn influenced by the mood of the times. Unfortunately, these latter elements reflected the sense of confusion that gripped the West in the aftermath of the Cold War. This paper argues that we will continue to be perplexed by the enemy in the war on terror so long as we are unclear as to our own purpose and direction. Indeed, the perpetrators of such acts today appear more influenced by Western dystopianism than Eastern mysticism. Real resilience requires having a narrative of our own that projects a purpose beyond responding to adversity.

### Key Points

- The framework of meaning that held the West together much of the twentieth century has ended
- Presuming a political ideology behind terrorism analyses the present through the prism of the past
- Al Qa'ida and domestic nihilists are parasitic upon mainstream caricatures of Western degeneracy
- Extremism is the extreme expression of mainstream ideas and Islam is their motif not their motive
- Our response to terrorism – shaped by a dystopian culture that is our own – determines its impact

### Know Thyself

*When I was coming up, it was a dangerous world, and you knew exactly who they were. It was us versus them, and it was clear who they were. Today we are not so sure who they are, but we know they're there.*

Bush (2000)

With these words, given before he was elected President, George W. Bush captured some of the uncertainty that had gripped the U.S. establishment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Celebrated by some as heralding the 'End of History' (Fukuyama, 1989), the dismantling of the framework that had largely organised world affairs (and shaped identities) – both internationally and domestically – across much of the twentieth century proved unsettling for all those who understood themselves through it. Such confusions continue to this day, and not simply in the U.S. After a recent terror-related incident that targeted the vicinity of the Legislative Buildings of British Columbia on Canada Day, the BC Premier announced:

*They want us to be governed by fear. They want us to look on each other with suspicion. They want us to be seized with anger. They want this because they hate the things that make us Canadian.*

Clark (2013)

But, as some analysts immediately noted, who exactly were the ‘they’ (who the RCMP described as being ‘*inspired by al-Qa’ida*’) that she was pointing to? In this case, it would appear to have been a petty-criminal and failed heavy metal musician turned Muslim convert, and his methadone-taking, common-law wife, neither of whom particularly kept their dislikes discrete. And – just as significantly – what exactly are ‘*the things that make us Canadian*’ (or American, or British, or anything else for that matter)? As the British writer James Heartfield notes in his critique of the postmodern outlook (2002), constantly calling into question the object of our attention also points to confusion relating to the subject – ourselves. Yet, almost ten years into the war on terror, President Barack Obama would still write in his Foreword to the 2011 U.S. National Strategy for Counterterrorism, that:

*To defeat al-Qa’ida, we must define with precision and clarity who we are fighting.*

Obama (2011)

It is the argument of this paper that – particularly in relation to what has become known as ‘*homegrown terrorism*’ – not only have we failed to understand the enemy but, more importantly, the extent to which *we* have changed too and how this shapes those we confront. It is our lack of vision and direction for society that generates confusion over who the enemy is in the war on terror, and how to respond to them.

## Interpreting Meaning

The common adage that; ‘*Generals always fight the last war*’, could be augmented to include all-manner of other professionals – including politicians, media commentators and even intelligence analysts. A mental model once ingrained is truly difficult to shake off. The atrocities of 9/11 necessitated a response. Maybe it would have been too much to ask that this be as measured as that of the mother of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh who said of her son’s murder at the hands of a self-styled jihadist in 2005:

*What is so regrettable ... is that Theo has been murdered by such a loser, such an incoherent person. Murder or manslaughter is always a terrible thing, but to be killed by such a figure makes it especially hard.*

Van Gogh (2005)

As the Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl (1946) noted over half a century before, it is not suffering that destroys people – but suffering without meaning. So, after 9/11, a meaning – political ideology – was presumed and projected. It allowed a disoriented administration the semblance of clarity and offered a cohering mission to society. They were facilitated in this by the perpetrators themselves, whose chatter about global jihad was taken at face value. In a similar way, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq led – in 2003 – to its invasion. Any lack of evidence was either ignored or taken to confirm pre-existing views regarding how devious the regime was. Either way, policy needs and presumptions – not evidence – determined outcomes.

The same is true of much intelligence. This necessarily combines information with the interpretation of that information. Yet, time and again, when examining intelligence failures the tendency is to blame just the information. Either insufficient information is highlighted, or there being too much to analyse. Alternatively, analysts worry about being provided with false, or misleading, information. They rarely question their frameworks. So, because in the past protests and violent outbreaks usually had a political or ideological purpose, today politicians, commentators and analysts look for political and ideological explanations – even when all the evidence points to the absence of these.

Groups such as the IRA and the PLO fought national liberation struggles. They used terror as a tactical means to achieve their strategic ends. But they knew above all that they needed to win the hearts and minds of their own communities for the struggle. In other words, they relied on mobilizing *a conscious and coherent collective*. And they confronted an equally conscious and coherent state. Failures, on all sides, can be traced to their alignment – or not – with the people they claimed to speak and act on behalf of. But al-Qa'ida and the offshoots it supposedly inspires could not be any more different. Whilst some claim to speak on behalf of the '*Ummah*', there is no evidence of any community ever having been consulted – let-alone engaged. That is why even the families and friends of those involved express shock to hear of their activities.

Neither is there any coherent text outlining their purported mission, or aims. Rather, much of this has been projected for them by analysts who seek to fill the vacuum of information left behind after the various acts of destruction with their own pet prejudices. Indeed – most strikingly – when asked to articulate their demands on television, one of the perpetrators of the Mumbai attacks was heard placing the phone down and asking one of his co-conspirators what these were (Ullah, 2008). Even if the perpetrators were mindless canon-fodder as some suggested, and even if we know the real origins of these attacks, this still fails to explain why to date no one has come forward to claim responsibility for these, as well as many others. And when they do – through so-called martyrdom videos and other media – there is precious little content other than a rambling rage.

Our failure then, is to attribute meaning – either political or ideological – to these. We thereby imbue vexatious acts of violence with greater import than they deserve. By doing so, we also attribute far too much authority and power to small numbers of individuals. Implicitly, we also identify a gaping hole at the heart of our own societies – where ideology and politics should be. For what kind of society is it that can be so rattled by events that – in perspective – should be seen as minor, if unfortunate, historical footnotes? Some analyses even effectively exonerate the individuals concerned by finding cause for them in the conditions of the developing world and our supposed insensitivity to these. Above all, our responses have allowed local and regional struggles, as well as isolated, irrational acts, to be presented as conflicts of global and epochal proportions.

## Reflected Caricatures

Osama bin Laden himself was fond of citing Western politicians, commentators, academics and diplomats in seeking to legitimize his ostensible cause (Bin Laden, 2005). Sounding like any other contemporary critic of American policy, he droned on about a rag-bag of motives at different times. From primarily complaining about the relationship between the U.S. and the Saudi regime he switched to focusing more on Palestine *after* the events of 9/11 and then only later to Iraq, echoing the anti-war lobby's claim that the war was simply a money-making venture for large corporations. He lambasted the U.S. for not signing up to the Kyoto treaty to control greenhouse gases, accused Washington of being controlled by a Jewish lobby, and argued that Western advertising exploited women. After the Madrid

bombings of 2004, he even proposed that Western leaders should have paid more attention to surveys there that revealed how few people supported going to war in Iraq. In all of these, bin Laden and his acolytes revealed themselves as being entirely parasitical upon the caricatures and dystopian views that proliferated in – and emanated from – the West, as well as being obsessed with what was being said about them. One of the final images of bin Laden – sat watching himself on television – is quite apposite in that regards.

But what kind of Muslim leader is it who advises people to read the journalist Robert Fisk or the academic Noam Chomsky rather than, as one might have supposed, the Koran? And why did he choose to piggyback his claims on Western opinion-poll data and the views of environmentalists in order to get his points across? (Although we should note that contemporary political leaders and religious figures in the West do much the same thing). Ayman al-Zawahiri too – once right-hand man of bin Laden and the group's supposed intellectual – displayed similar tendencies of drawing ideas and inspiration from Western concerns when he noted, in relation to his growing, if evidently unrealistic, fascination with developing some kind of chemical or biological weapon:

*Despite their extreme danger, we only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials.*

Al-Zawahiri (1999)

In truth, bin Laden and al-Qa'ida entirely lacked any substantial ideas of their own, let-alone anything that amounts to an ideology. Bin Laden was the leader of nothing, who became – in an age enthralled by celebrity – the iconic terrorist of our times (Cornish, 2008), unable to control his own fans never mind the course of history (Devji, 2005). Sadly, only in an age when image and style trump insight and substance at every turn could such aimless violence come to be seen as so portentous and requiring an all-consuming response.

Unwittingly, the new terrorists were both a product of the contemporary confusions while inadvertently providing the authorities with a flimsy new purpose. Criticism of the West has long been around, but never before has it taken such a degraded form as in our post-political age. Even the presumed rise of religion in the recent period points to the evisceration of political engagement. And there is a world of difference between the cult-like religiosities of the present and traditional, religious organizations – though the former may better countenance rash acts of barbarism through their being less accountable to any wider institutions or mores.

## Homegrown Nihilists

Far from being atypical, recent self-styled jihadists intercepted in the domestic arena have exemplified the ineptness of the ever-expanding roll-call of marginal fantasists and want-to-be terrorists who claim to be part of, or inspired by, al-Qa'ida. The British journalist, Brendan O'Neill, has published a list of *'The 10 stupidest Islamic terrorists'* (2013). It captures just some of their tactical, technical and organizational incompetence, irrespective of economic or educational backgrounds. And these form just the tip of the iceberg. This is not to dismiss the potential lethality of these plots and the devastating consequences they could have had upon those in their proximity if they been successful in their aims – nor should we confuse them with the more serious threat posed to troops in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.

Yet, after each of these incidents, rather than point to the combination of vacuous bravado and concomitant failure, politicians, commentators and analysts have preferred to pursue purported links to al-Qa'ida, which they invariably make connection to – however tenuously. But associating with groups such as Al-Mujahiroun or Jemaah Islamiyah, travelling to Pakistan to attend some kind of training camp, or surfing jihadist websites including the now notorious *Inspire* magazine – supposedly al-Qa'ida's web-based English language organ – does not explain anything.

To parody Oscar Wilde (1895); *'to lose some may be regarded as a misfortune; to lose so many looks like carelessness'*.

Ideas do not transform people unless they resonate with their experience and existing interpretation of the world. The question then becomes: Why do the ideas of fringe organizations appear to fall on such fertile soil? And, what is it about the West that seems to predispose some to this here? In view of the sheer weight of alternative media to *Inspire* and the other materials that supposedly incite terrorism, surely the really awkward question is: What is it about our society that we fail to inspire, often young, bright and energetic individuals, and provide them with rules, structures and meaning to live their lives by, such that they are left to look for these in arcane arenas?

Ultimately, ideas have to emerge from somewhere. And extremism is the extreme expression of mainstream ideas. If our aim is to stop the extremists, it will have to be to those mainstream ideas that drive them that we begin to address ourselves. In the most recent incidents – in Boston MA, London UK and Victoria BC – as well as many others, what we find are individuals consumed by a sense of self-righteousness. Islam – if it features at all – is often more an afterthought than a driver. It is their motif, not their motive.

But moral indignation is encouraged by contemporary society, which often presents a negative view of the present combined with a dystopian projection of the future. And – disengaged from what passes for politics today – many come to develop an aggressive sense of entitlement, indulged by a society they seek simultaneously to distance themselves from. The outcome covers the spectrum from asserting a new identity – young women wearing headscarves whose mothers never wore one – to inchoate rage, expressed either passively, in the so-called Occupy movement, more acutely, as in recent episodes of rioting, and violently.

It is the unpredictable emergence of the latter that has led some analysts to express their surprise at how rapidly so-called self-radicalization can occur. In fact, it is their failure to identify the social currents beneath the surface that leads them to viewing matters this way. Indeed, the parallels between *'homegrown terrorists'* and other *'lone wolves'* – such as Anders Breivik, who murdered 77 people in a bombing and shooting spree in Norway in 2012 – as well as the perpetrators of various mass high-school shootings (another relatively recent phenomenon), are more important than any differences between them pertaining to the particular cultural outlooks they then adopt.

## Domestic Drivers

Space here precludes a detailed exposition of the various social, economic, political and cultural drivers of these trends that were largely catalysed into being only recently. That modernity itself produces turmoil and disruption, while generating constant uncertainty, has been known for a long time (Marx and Engels, 1848) – despite the apparently recent discovery of this by some security analysts. But, over the course, of much of the twentieth century, the Cold War effectively kept the potential for change

identified by many (see for example; Riesman, 1950; Bell, 1960; Sennett, 1977 and Lasch, 1979), in check, by demanding adherence to particular worldviews. The stand-off between the U.S. and its allies against the Soviet Union and its satellite states across Eastern Europe and elsewhere, divided the world externally and was reproduced internally against the *'enemy within'*, understood then as emanating from trade unions or the political Left.

But, from about the mid-1980s, the erosion of the supposed twin threats of Soviet-style Marxism and state socialism – finally made evident through the unanticipated fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 – opened the floodgates on the possibility for both public/political and private/personal transformation (see, for instance; Laïdi 1994, Giddens 1994, and more recently; Furedi 2005). This also encouraged the erosion of the distinction between these domains. Without the forces that had held the political Right together for so long, establishment elites were soon exposed as lacking any positive purpose or vision for society, and rapidly fell-out among themselves. Replacement enemies were postulated, but none of the new litany of demons – from the Contras in Nicaragua and General Aideed in Somalia, through to Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia and Saddam Hussein in Iraq – could live up to the caché of the military, material and moral urgency that had been imposed by the Red Army.

Little wonder then that even freedom advocating, Cold War warriors, such as Margaret Thatcher, would oppose change when it came, briefing President Gorbachev in private meetings that the lifting of the Iron Curtain and German reunification would:

*undermine the stability of the whole international situation and could endanger our security.*

Thatcher, 1989

She added that – despite public pronouncements to the contrary – President Reagan was of the same view.

New organizing frameworks for society have struggled to fill the void left by the erosion of the old political and moral frameworks shaped by the interest-based politics of Left and Right. Ideology has – to some extent – made way for identity, but, as some have noted (Heartfield, Furedi), the latter is a very fragile sense of identity, based on a *'diminished'* sense of human agency. That is why there is such resonance today for prevailing discourses that emphasize risk and uncertainty – despite these always having been part of the human condition. More problematically, this culture also elevates our sense of vulnerability over resilience, irrespective of official intent.

Even those charged with defeating terrorism buy-in to such negative narratives, pointing in their turn to the possibility (rather than probability) of future catastrophes (variously to be caused by limited resources, viruses, climate, population, the economy, technology, and other forces). They then imagine and act upon worst-case scenarios rather than focusing on the most likely. In the past, such pessimistic projections would have been condemned as a loss of nerve that encouraged low morale – today they are considered sensible precautions.

They impact not just counterterrorism but all walks of life leading governments, for example, to encourage their nationals to flee the vicinity of Tokyo in the aftermath of the Fukushima power plant emergency triggered by the Great Tohoku earthquake – rather than humanely staying behind and helping those they had been with. A similarly, shallow deterministic outlook, explains why the rudimentary findings of neuroscience and simplistic business models have been co-opted to shed light on the causes and trajectories of terrorism. It is because they present a process without a subject in an

age when our sense of autonomy and potential has been so curtailed. Accordingly, biological metaphors (ideas go viral, terrorists are spawned, etc...) proliferate, as these also downplay our role and intentions (as well as – inadvertently – our accountability too).

## Nervous Responses

By retreating from political ideology to process management in the West, uncertainty has effectively been allowed to drive world affairs rather than emerging from them. A concomitant sense of insecurity has encouraged politicians and people everywhere to avoid expressing firm principles and values independently of simply managing perceived, exogenous threats. But it is how we, as a society, respond to acts of destruction that determines their impact. Civilization cannot be bombed out of existence by terrorists. It can however be corroded from within if all we do is focus down onto technical solutions rather than expanding our horizons through a strategic vision that could project a positive sense of mission for society. In effect, we complete the acts perpetrated by domestic nihilists.

When the British Prime Minister flies back from his overseas engagements to be seen to be addressing the brutal murder of an off-duty soldier on a London street, or when the city of Boston is put into lockdown by the authorities pursuing an injured teenager on the rampage, no amount of words extolling our resolve and resilience can alter the implicit message of societies disoriented by adversity. Not only does this act as an encouragement to other loners and losers with an exaggerated sense of self-importance and grievance, it also flies in the face of the real solidarity and fortitude displayed by those most immediately affected. Such resolute responses at the time are then further undermined by the countless medical experts, media commentators and officials who all project about the long-lasting consequences on individuals and society that such attacks are held to have.

The record since 9/11 is replete with examples of incidents that led to the closure of city centers, the evacuation of hundreds of homes, the deployment of scores of armed units and the establishment of air exclusion zones, some of which concluded with the arrest of individuals that had been under prolonged surveillance and others their release subsequent to their having been found to be entirely innocent and acquitted. But if, as the British Home Secretary suggested in relation to one of these cases, the youth concerned posed '*a very real threat to the life and liberty of our country*' (Blunkett, 2003), what kind of person could threaten 60 million people? More importantly, as was also raised by the case in Canada more recently, what kind of country is it that can feel so threatened by the actions of such marginal figures?

Sadly, the focus on surveillance, protection, information and warnings that has emerged since 9/11 has the unintended consequences of promoting undue concern, mistrust and cynicism. It pushes people further apart from one another at a time when they need to be drawn together with a sense of common purpose. It also exemplifies the low view of the public and their likely responses evidently held by many in authority. As opposed to the contemporary obsession with needing to identify unanticipated shocks to the system, it seems – as is often the case – that it is long-term drift that will prove the more destabilizing in the long run. In this case, the drift created by consistently seeking to protect society from without rather than revitalizing it from within, and the gradual disengagement and distancing this fosters.

## Dystopian Projections

Less than 48 hours into the war on terror, British journalist Seumas Milne had an opinion piece published about the U.S. entitled; *'They can't see why they are hated'* (2001). Others soon followed, leading to expressions of outrage by establishment commentators. What they failed to notice was quite how normal such expressions of anti-Americanism had become. A sense of contempt for supposedly soulless American consumerism is widespread – even among those working for the likes of Google and Citibank. And surely when Michael Moore's *'Stupid White Men'* (2001) became a best-seller on both sides of the Atlantic – selling over 300 000 copies in the UK in its first year of publication alone – this should have alerted a few bright minds in the security agencies (and beyond) to a self-loathing that is significantly domestic in origin. This has little to do with America itself, but rather reflects a broader dissatisfaction with the world that targets the U.S. as its highest expression of success.

That debate had been fulminating for quite some time particularly among the old political Left (see, for example, Bloom, 1987), but the events of 9/11 catalyzed – rather than triggered – the soul-searching across the board to a new level. It is quite striking how common it is today to read book titles such as; *'The World Without Us'* (Weisman, 2007), or hear respected academics describing humanity as a *'plague'* (Gray, 2002). These, and countless others like them, point to the low view we have come to have of ourselves in the contemporary world. They point to a significant clash *within* civilization, rather than to that between civilizations pointed to by the American political scientist Samuel Huntington (1993). Unfortunately, they also serve to reinforce a cultural milieu within which low expectations and dystopian fantasies become the norm.

But such a dismal view of ourselves, our role and impact on the planet can become internalized by some. It frames a demoralized public discourse of apocalyptic failure and rejection that sustains those prepared to lose their lives – as well as those of others around them – in their misguided determination to leave their mark upon a world they feel encouraged to reject.

## Conclusion

America found itself, at the turn of the last century, an undisputable – if somewhat reluctant – world power. It more formally attained that role propelled by events elsewhere – but also inspired by the narrative of manifest destiny built on the Enlightenment optimism of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison and others. By the close of the century, it appeared more gripped by a sense of Millenarian pessimism. Built not on size, but on the initiative of those confronting the unknown, its founding and guiding ideology was that of *freedom* – freedom from the past, and freedom of conscience, initiative, enterprise and of will.

The U.S., as immortalized by Francis Scott Key in his poem of 1814 was *'the land of the free'* – not the *'land of the secure'* – as it appears some today would have it. He understood that people in all places and at all times had been prepared to risk it all to achieve this. We do not just *live* our lives – we *lead* them. And similar aspirations have inspired the struggles of others, however distorted these became in the years that ensued. To lose sight of this, to trade our freedom in order to be looked over by others and made to feel secure is just one of the confusions that now grips America. But the forgotten role of leaders today is to inspire people – not just to protect them – for people who believe in their cause or project are far more effective agents of it than those who are coerced, managed or nudged.

What is most missing in the war on terror has been a vision for society *beyond* terror. That is the essence of real resilience – neither a focus on response and recovery, nor even the aim to prepare and prevent – but rather a sense of what we are for in the absence of all adversities; a projection of purpose. Otherwise, as is the case here, we effectively allow the challenges we confront to determine us rather than the other way round. America still represents much of what is best in the world – as well as a little of what is worst. For all the challenges still confronting it, as well as the pretensions and delusions of others, the future remains for America to lose rather than for others to win.

But, over a decade into the war on terror, it is high time for the U.S.'s search for meaning to conclude through the re-invigoration of its founding values, as well as the identification of a new vision. That way, many of the disillusioned individuals who look elsewhere for purpose and meaning would not need to, and the few that get through would be framed in the proper context – as mindless criminals.

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